Abstract Privacy-preserving SQL computation in distributed relational database is one of important applications of secure multiparty computation. In contrast with comparatively more works on privacy-preserving data-query in database, only few works deal with provably-secure privacy-preserving data manipulations, among which the join operator is the most powerful in generating new data (relation). We propose a very general cryptographic protocol framework for secure 2-party join computation based on anonymous IBE (identity-based encryption) scheme and its user private-keys blind generation techniques. This construction is provably GUC (generalized universally composable) secure in standard model with acceptable efficiency. In addition, an efficient instantiation based-on the anonymous Boyen-Waters IBE scheme is presented which user private-key's blind generation protocol may be of independent values.
with attributes w and y. The goal is securely computing Join(w:X 1 ,X 2 ) and outputing at P 2 1 . suppose X 1   1 1  2 2  3 3  4 4  2  2 2  4 4 is filled with entries {(w ,x ), (w ,x ), (w ,x ), (w ,x )} and X is filled with {(w ,y ), (w ,y ), (w 5 ,y ), (w ,y )} where w 's, x 's and y 's are values of the attribute w, x and y respectively. P generates IBE's master public/secret-key (mpk,msk), sends mpk and all ξ =E(mpk,w ,x ||M )(i=1,2,3,4) to P . When P tries to decipher each ξ by private-keys usk(w ), usk(w ), usk(w ) and usk(w )(obtained via Π's user private-keys blind generation protocol), only usk(w ) and usk(w ) can succeed in obtaining the plaintext with a suffix M . As a result, P gets X 's entries {(w ,x ),(w ,x )} and can now get the result of Join(w:X ,X ), i.e., {(w ,x ,y ),(w ,x ,y )}, by a local join computation. Note that Π's anonymity and data-privacy prevents P from knowing anything about X beyond {(w ,x ),(w ,x )} while the private-key generation protocol's blindness prevents P from knowing anything about X . This protocol's incorrectness probability is not 0, but by chosing M 0 lengthy enough, e.g., 128-bit, its incorrectness probability can be negligible in practice.
To be GUC-secure, the formal constrution is more involved (section 3). It is constant-round in communications and linear-size in message-complexity. In computation-complexity, one party is O(N 1 +N 2 ) and the other is O(N 1 N 2 ) encryptions/decriptions where N 1 , N 2 are each party's private table's cardinality. Note that O(N 1 N 2 ) is also local join operator's computation complexity [7] , i.e., neglecting a constant factor our construction's efficiency is asymptotically the same as that of conventional join operator.
The formal construction is also well-modularized, only executing few zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge which can be efficiently instantiated. Most importantly and distinctively, our construction is provably GUC-secure against malicious adversaries assuming static corruptions in the ACRS(augmented common reference string) model [5] . For this goal we introduce a notion of identity-augmented non-malleable zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge which may be of independent values. This construction can be also enhanced to be GUC-secure against malicious adversaries assuming adaptive corruptions in erasure model by some slight modifications.
Why IBE?
Although there can be other approaches to the same solution, our approach has the good potential to deal with more complicated cases within a unified framework. In fact what we deal with in this paper is just the most simple (also most frequently-used) case: equijoin. A general join operator (called theta-join) involves some condition on attributes from each of its argument tables, i.e., Join(θ(a,b): X 1 ,X 2 ) where θ is a predicate, a, b are vectors of attributes of X 1 and X 2 respectively, e.g., a=(a (1) ,a (2) ), b=(b (1) ,b (2) ), for equijoin θ(a,b)≡a (1) =b (1) ∧ a (2) =b (2) but in general θ(a,b) can be any predicate, e.g., a (1) <b (1) , a (1) +a (2) ≥b (1) +b (2) , a (1) <b (1) ∧ a (2) =b (2) , etc. We believe that some further extensions to recently proposed ABE schemes(e.g., [11, 17] ) which are powerful generalizations of IBE will be helpful to solve such secure SQL computation problems while keeping the general protocol ramework in section 3 unchanged, which has obvious advantages in practice. f Organization Section 2 briefly presents all required important notions and facts, including an enhanced concept of zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge (def. 2.4). Section 3 presents the general construction and section 4 instantiates it via the anonymous Boyen-Waters IBE scheme. For space limitations, detailed proofs are presented in Appdenix B and C. Appendix D presents a general and efficient construction of the required zero-knowledge proof protocol.
NOTATIONS, DEFINITIONS AND TOOLS
P.P.T. means "probabilistic polynomial-time", x||y means string x and y in concatenation, |x| means string x's size(in bits) and |X|(X is a set) means X's cardinality, x← $ X means randomly selecting x from the domain X. k denotes the complexity parameter. ≈ PPT stands for computational indistinguishability and ≈ for perfect indistinguishability.
Secure Join Computation and Its GUC Security
Briefly speaking, GUC-security means that any adversary attacking the real-world protocol can be efficiently simulated by an adversary attacking the ideal-world functionality, both have the outputs indistinguishable by the (malicious) environment. For space limitations, we assume the reader's familiarity with the whole theory in [4] [5] [6] and only provide necessary descriptions with respect to the secure join computation problem here. Similar to many theoretical works, we focus on the 2-party scenario. Furthermore, in this paper we only consider the horizontal distribution setting in which each table is at a site as a whole, none table is separated among different sites. Let X 1 and X 2 denote the tables with attributes w, u (1) and w, u (2) respectively, w is the common attribute and for equijoin we consider only single such common attribute without loss of generality (in case of multiple common attributes, e.g., v and w, we simply consider a imaginary single attribute v||w which values are just the concatenation of values of v and w ). The ideal cryptographic functionality to perform equijoin computation on X 1 and X 2 with equality constraint on w is defined as F Join : (X 1 ,X 2 )→ (|w| 2 , |X 1 |||Join(w:X 1 ,X 2 )) where |w| 2 means the number of different values of w in X 2 and Join(w:X 1 ,X 2 ) means the reault of ideal relational join computation. More precisely, let P 1 *, P 2 * be parties in ideal model with private tables X 1 and X 2 respectively, N 1 =|X 1 |, N 2 =|X 2 |, S be the adversary in ideal model, the ideal model orks as follows: w On receiving message (sid,"input",P 1 *,X 1 ) from P 1 *, F Join records X 1 and sends message (sid,"input",N 1 ) to P 2 * and S; On receiving message (sid,"input",P 2 *,X 2 ) from P 2 *, F Join records X 2 and sends (sid,"input",|w| 2 ) to P 1 * and S.
On receiving message (sid,"equijoin", P 2 *) from P* 2 , F Join responses P 2 * with message (sid,"equijoin", Join(w:X 1 ,X 2 )).
At last P 1 * outputs |w| 2 , P 2 * outputs N 1 ||Join(w:X 1 ,X 2 ).
Let ψ be the real-world protocol, each party P i of ψ corresponds to an ideal-world party P i *. A is the real-world adversary attacking ψ, Z is the environment in which the real protocol/ideal functionality executes. According to [4] [5] , Z is a P.P.T. machine modeling all malicious behaviors against the protocol's execution. Z is empowered to provide inputs to parties and interacts with A and S, e.g., Z gives special inputs or instructions to A/S, collects outputs from A/S to make some analysis, etc. In UC theory [4] , Z cannot access parties' shared functionality (such shared functionality is specified in specific protocol) while in the improved GUC theory [5] Z is enhanced to do this, i.e., to provide inputs to and get outputs from the shared functionality. As a result, in GUC theory Z is strictly stronger and more realistic than in UC theory.
Let output Z (ψ,A) denote the outputs (as a joint stochastic variable)from ψ's parties P 1 , P 2 under Z and A, output Z (F Join ,S) denote the similar thing under Z and S. During the real/ideal protocol's execution, Z (as an active distinguisher) interacts with A/S and raises its final output, w.l.o.g., 0 or 1. Such output is denoted as Z(output Z (ψ,A),u) and Z(output Z (F Join ,S),u) respectively, where u is the auxiliary information. Definition 2.1(GUC security [5] ) If for any P.P.T. adversary A in real-world, there exists a P.P.T. adversary S (called A's simulator) in ideal-world, both corrupt the same set of parties, such that for any environment Z the function |P[Z(output Z (ψ,A),u)=1]-P[Z(output Z (F Join ,S),u)=1]| is negligible in complexity parameter k (hereafter denote this fact as output Z (ψ,A)≈ PPT output Z (F Join ,S)), then we define that ψ GUC-emulates F Join or say ψ is GUC-secure, denoted as ψ→ GUC F Join .
The most significant property of GUC-security is the universal composition theorem. Briefly speaking, given protocols φ 2 , φ 1 and ψ(φ 1 ) where ψ(φ 1 ) is the so-called φ 1 -hybrid protocol, if φ 2 → GUC φ 1 then (under some technical conditions, e.g., subroutine-respecting) ψ(φ 2 /φ 1 )→ GUC ψ(φ 1 ) where ψ(φ 2 /φ 1 ) is a protocol in which every call to the subprotocol φ 1 is replaced with a call to φ 2 . This guarantees that a GUC-secure protocol can be composed in any execution context while still preserving its proved security. A similar consequence is also ture in UC theory but with some serious constraints. All details are presented in [4] [5] . ACRS model is defined in [5] 's sec. 4 and repeated in Appendix A in our paper.
IBE Scheme, Its Anonymity and Blind User-Private Key Generation Functionality
In addition to data-privacy, anonymity(key-privacy) is another valuable property for public-key encryption schemes [1] . An IBE scheme П=(Setup, UKG, E, D) is a group of P.P.T. algorithms, where Setup takes as input the complexity parameter k to generate master public/secret-key pair (mpk, msk), UKG takes as input msk and user's id a to generate a's user private-key usk(a); E takes (mpk,a,M) as input where M is the message plaintext to generate ciphertext y, D takes (mpk,usk(a),y) as input to do decryption. Altogether these algorithms satisfy the consistency property: for any k, a and M At last, P 1 * outputs its last n, P 2 * outputs all its obtained usk(a)'s.
(Identity-Augmented) Non-Malleable Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge
This subsection presents the concept of zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge following [8, 14] with slight symbolic modifications. Let L be a NP language, R is its associated P-class binary relation. i.e., x∈L iff there exists w such that R(x,w)=1. Let A, B be two machines, then A(x;B) [σ] represents A's output due to its interactions with B under a public common input x and common reference string (c.r.s.) σ, tr A,B (x) [σ] represents the transcripts due to interactions between A and B under a common input x and c.r.s. σ. When we emphasize A's private input, say y, we also use the expression A y (x;B) [σ] and tr A(y),B (x) [σ] respectively. Let A=(A 1 ,A 2 ), B and C be machines where A 1 can coordinate with A 2 by transferring status information to it, then (<B,A 1 >,<A 2 ,C>) represents the interaction between A 1 and B, (maybe concurrently) A 2 and C. Due to such interactions, let tr be the transcripts between A 2 and C, u be the final output from A 2 and v be the final output form C, then (<B,A 1 >,<A 2 ,C>)'s output is denoted as (u,tr,v). Two transcripts tr 1 and tr 2 are matched each other, if tr 1 and tr 2 are the same message sequence(consisted of the same messages in the same order) and the only difference is that any corresponding messages are in the opposite directions.
Let A be a machine, the symbol A represents such a machine which accepts two kinds of instructions: the first one is in the form of ("start", i,x,w) and A in response starts a new instance of A, associates it with a unique name i and provides it with public input x and private input w; the second is in form of ("message",i,m) and A in response sends message m to instance A i and then returns A i 's response to m. Definition 2.3(Zero-Knowldeg Proof and Non-Malleable Zero-Knowledge Proof Protocol [14] ) ZPoK R =(D crs ,P,V,Sim) where Sim=(Sim 1 ,Sim 2 ) is a group of P.P.T. algorithms, k is complexity parameter, D crs takes k as input and generates c.r.s. σ; P is called prover, takes (σ,x,w) as input where R(x,w)=1 and generates a proof π; V is called verifier, takes (σ,x) as input and generates 0 or 1; Sim 1 (k) generates (σ,s), Sim 2 takes x∈ L and (σ,s) as input and generates the simulation. All algorithms except D crs and Sim 1 take the c.r.s. σ as one of their inputs, so σ is no longer explicitly included in all the following expressions unless for emphasis. Now ZPoK R is defined as a zero-knowledge proof protocol for relation R, if the following properties are all satisfied: (1) For any x∈L and σ←D crs , it's always true that P[V(x;P) [σ] =1]=1; (2) For any P.P.T. algorithm A, x∉L and σ←D crs , it's always true that P[V(x;A) [ 
(3) For any P.P.T. algorithm A which outputs 0 or 1, let ε be empty string, the function |P[σ←D crs ; b←A(ε;P) [σ] : b=1] -P[(σ,s)←Sim 1 (k); b←A(ε;Sim 2 (s)) [σ] : b=1]| is always negligible in k, where we emphasize the fact by symbol Sim 2 (s) that all Sim 2 instances have the same s as one of their inputs.
The non-malleable zero-knowledge proof protocol for relation R is defined as NMZPoK R = (D crs ,P,V,Sim,Ext) where Sim=(Sim 1 ,Sim 2 ), Ext=(Ext 1 ,Ext 2 ) and (D crs ,P,V,Sim) is a zero-knowledge proof protocol for relation R as above, P.P.T. algorithm Ext 1 (k) generates (σ,s,τ) and the interactive P.P.T. machine Ext 2 (named as witness extractor) takes (σ,τ) and protocol's transcripts as its input and extracts w, and all the following properties hold: (4) The distribution of the first output of Sim 1 is identical to that of Ext 1 ; (5) For any τ, the distribution of the output of V is identical to that of Ext 2 's restricted output which does not include the extracted value (w); (6) There exists a negligible function η(k) (named as knowledge-error function) such that for any P.P.T. algorithm A=(A 1 ,A 2 ) it's true that
It's easy to see that NMZPoK R is a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge. [8, 14] developed an efficient method to derive non-malleable zero-knowledge proof protocols based-on simulation-sound tag-based commitment schemes and the so-called Ω-protocols (proposed in [14] ). In order to achieve GUC-security in our construction, we need to further enhance NMZPoK to the concept of identity-augmented non-malleable zero-knowldege proof protocol(IA-NMZPoK) as follows. Definition 2.4(IA-NMZPoK Protocol for Relation R) The IA-NMZPoK Protocol for relation R, IA-NMZPoK R =(D,Setup,UKG,P,V,Sim,Ext) where Sim=(Sim 1 ,Sim 2 ) and Ext=(Ext 1 ,Ext 2 ), is a group of P.P.T. algorithms. Setup(k) generates master public/secret-key pair (mpk,msk), UKG(msk,id) generates id's private-key usk(id) where id∈{P,V}(the prover's and verifier's identity). Sim 1 takes usk(V) as input, Ext 1 takes usk(P) as input. All algorithms except Setup take (mpk,σ) as one of its inputs(so it no longer explicitly appears). The protocol has the same properties as R's NMZPoK protocol in definition 2.3.
Note that by this definition an IA-NMZPoK protocol works in ACRS model [5] which ACRS is its mpk. In addition, only the corrupt verifier can run Sim (Sim 1 taking usk(V) as input) and only the corrupt prover can run Ext (Ext 1 taking usk(P) as input). This is exactly what is required in ACRS model. Given a relation R, a general and efficient construction of IA-NMZPoK protocol for R is presented in Appendix D.
Commitment Scheme
We need the non-interactive identity-based trapdoor commitment sheme [5] (IBTC for short) as another important tool in our construction. cmt is M's commitment with respect to id. These algorithms are consistant, i.e., for any M:
contains id||usk(id) as one of its components so FakeDmt doesn't explicitly take id and usk(id) as its input). A secure IBTC scheme has the following properties: 
negligible function in k. [5] presented an efficient IBTC construction and proved its security.
GENERAL CONSTRUCTION
Now we present the formal consctrution of the real-world private equijoin protocol Ψ. P 1 and P 2 denote two real-world parties with private tables X 1 and X 2 , each with attributes w, x and w, y respectively (more generally x is the vector of all attributes in X 1 othe than w, similar for y, but this is Blind-UKG cannot guarantee Ψ's GUC-security but only "half GUC-security" instead (i.e., the real adversary A corrupting P 1 can be completely simulated by an ideal adversary S but this is not true when A corrupts P 2 . Only data-privacy can be proved in the latter case). In order to make the real adversary completely simulatable in ideal-world, some additional property is required for ∆ П Blind-UKG . This leads to definition 3.1 and it is not hard to verify that our concrete construction of ∆ П Blind-UKG in next section really satisfies it. (2) UKG ∆ (msk ∆ ,id) outputs a trapdoor usk ∆ (P 2 ) when id=P 2 (key-receiver's identity) and outputs nothing otherwise. (3) for any user-id a, honest P 1 and any P.P.T. algorithm A, it is true that(via notations in subsection 2.3) Ext 1 (usk(P 2 )) outputs (σ,τ) such that P[Ext 2 (mpk||τ ; A(a)) [σ] =a]>P[A a (mpk; P 1 (mpk,msk)) [σ] =UKG(msk,a)]-δ(k) where (mpk,msk) is П's master public/secret-key owned by P 1 (mpk is published).
We stress that all extractors in definition 2.3 and definition 3.1 are non-rewinding. 
Combining all the instantiations of subprotocols in this general construction (some presented in next section and Appendix D), it's easy to see that we can get a O(1) and O(N 1 +N 2 ) message-complexity solution. The exact computation efficiency analysis can be only done for specific instantiations (e.g., that presented in next section) which is provided in the full version paper. The proof is in Appendix B.
Theorem 3.1 Suppose that IBE scheme П = (ESetup,UKG,E,D) is both id-selective

AN INSTANTIATION VIA BOYEN-WATERS IBE SCHEME
Theorem 3.1 presents security conditions for the general construction Ψ, among which some are available in existing works, e.g., the commitment scheme can be directly borrowed from [5] . The subprotocols which require new efficient constructions are only IBE scheme's user private-keys generation protocol and the protocol IA-NMZPoK((a,r): ξ=E(mpk,a,M 0 ;r)). In this section we present an efficient instantiation of Ψ via Boyen-Waters IBE scheme. The related zero-knowledge protocol's construction is presented in Appendix D. [3] Given an bilinear group pairing ensemble J={(p,G 1 
Boyen-Waters IBE
r 1 , r 2 ← $ Z p ; usk(a)←(, , ); ,
User Private-Keys Blind Generation Protocol and Its GUC-Security
For simplicity we only present how to blindly generate usk(a) for a single user-id a. The generalization to blindly generating usk(a 1 )||…||usk(a N ) for multiple user-id's a 1 ||…||a N is trival and still constant-round, though the total message-complexity is linearly increased.
The two parties are P 1 (with private input msk) and P 2 (with private input a). Both parties have the common input mpk where (mpk,msk) are generated by IBE scheme's ESetup(k) (usually msk per se is the randomness in ESetup so we use a simplified notation mpk←ESetup(msk) hereafter).
has two IA-NMZPoK subprotocols (see below) which ACRS's are denoted as mpk Waters ((a, r 1 , r 2 , y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , y 4 
Boyen
For intuition the protocol is presented in the figure below where IA-NMZPoKs' arrows point from zero-knowledge's prover to its verifier. 
It's easy to show by direct calculation that P 2 outputs the correct
Regarding security, we have 
APPENDIX.A ACRS MODEL
Recently [5] improves and generalizes the early UC-theory proposed in [4] to make a more general, realistic and strictly stronger security notion. The universal composition theorem is still true in this paradigm, however, the pre-setup needs to be strictly enhanced. In GUC paradigm the CRS model is insufficient to implement general cryptographic functionalities, instead we need a new pre-setup model called ACRS(augmented common reference string) model. This pre-setup can be performed via a shared functionality Running Phase: on receiving message ("CRS request",P i ) from any party P i , response ("ACRS", mpk) to P i and the adversary S;
On receiving message ("Retrieve",sid,P i ) from a corrupt party P i , compute usk(P i )←UKG(msk,P i ) and return the message ("Private-key", sid, usk(P i )) to P i ; if P i is not a corrupt party, response nothing.
APPENDIX.B PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1
We prove the GUC-security in two cases that the real-world adversary A corrupts P 1 or P 2 respectively. Below P 1 * and P 2 * stand for P 1 and P 2 's respective counterparts in ideal-world.
All parties are assumed to be initialized with a copy of the common reference string ACRS, i.e., the concatenation of TC's master public-key mpk TC , ∆ П Blind-UKG 's mpk ∆ , the IA-NMZPoK protocol's mpk ZK and M 0 , generated by the pre-setup G ACRS . For this ACRS, its msk=msk TC ||msk ∆ ||msk ZK and UKG(msk,id) responses with usk(id)=usk TC (id)||usk ∆ (id)||usk ZK (id) where usk TC (id), usk ∆ (id) and usk ZK (id) are respectively TC's, ∆ П Blind-UKG 's and the IA-NMZPoK protocol's user private-keys corresponding to id∈{P 1 ,P 2 }.
(1) A corrupts P 1 : for simplicity we first make the proof in F П Blind-UKG -hybrid model and then complete the proof by generalized universal composition theorem. Let X 1 ={(u 1 *,x 1 *),…,(u N1 *,x N1 *)} be A's(i.e., P 1 's) own table, X 2 ={(v 1 *, y 1 *),…,(v N1 *, y N2 *)} be P 2 *'s own table. We need to construct an ideal adversary S 1 who corrupts P 1 *, runs A as a black-box and simulates the real-world honest party P 2 to interact with A:
On receiving the message (sid,"input",N 2 ) from F Join , S 1 gets usk(P 1 ) by querying the shared functionality G ACRS with ("retrieve",sid,P 1 ) where usk(P 1 )=usk TC (P 1 )||usk ∆ (P 1 )||usk ZK (P 1 )), computes (σ,s,τ)←IA-NMZPoK::Ext 1 (usk ZK (P 1 ))( to avoid ambiguity, we use Γ::f to represent a protocol Γ's algorithm f), generates N 2 entries (v 1 , y 1 ),…, (v N2 , y N2 ) at random and then starts A;
After A sends the first message mpk||cmt, S 1 interacts with A as an honest key-receiver in model of F (2) A corrupts P 2 : Denote A's(i.e., P 2 's) own table as X 2 ={(v* 1 , y* 1 ),…,(v* N2 , y* N2 )}, P 1 *'s own table as X 1 = {(u* 1 , x* 1 ),…,( (u* N1 ,x* N1 )}, we need to construct an ideal adversary S 2. S 2 corrupts P 2 *, gets usk(P 2 ) by querying the pre-setup G ACRS with ("retrieve",sid,P 2 ) where usk(P 2 )=usk TC (P 2 )||usk ∆ (P 2 )|| usk ZK (P 2 ), generates (σ, s)←IA-NMZPoK::Sim 1 (usk ZK (P 2 )), runs A as a black-box and simulates the real-world honest party P 1 to interact with A:
On receiving message (sid,"input",N 1 ) from F Join , S 2 generates (u 1 , x 1 ),…,(u N1 , x N1 ) at random, computes (mpk,msk)←Setup(k) and ξ i ←E(mpk,u i ,x i ||M 0 ; r i ) for each (u i ,x i ) where r i is the independent randomness in each encryption, computes (cmt 0 ,λ)←FakeCmt(mpk TC ,P 2 ,usk TC (P 2 )), starts A and sends the message mpk||cmt 0 to A; S 2 interacts with A as the user private-key generator in ∆ П Blind-UKG and calls the extractor ∆ П Blind-UKG ::Ext ∆ (usk ∆ (P 2 )) to extract v* 1 ,…,v* N (N is the number of distinct v* i 's), generates y 1 ,…, y N at random, sends the message (sid,"input", P 2 *, {(v* 1 , y 1 ),…,(v* N , y N )} to F Join ; S 2 sends the message (sid,"join",P 2 *) to F Join and gets the response {(u* j1 , x* j1 , y j1 ),…, (u* jt , x* jt , y jt )} (i.e., the equijoin of X 1 and {(v* 1 , y 1 ),…,(v* N , y N )}, in particular this result implies that there are t-v j 's such that u* j1 =v j1 ,…, u* jt =v* jt ). To simplify the notation, denote this response Because of TC's equivocation property, (cmt,dmt)'s are P.P.T.-indistinguishable in both cases; because of IBE scheme's selective ANO_CPA anonymity and IND_CPA data-privacy, ξ 1 ||…||ξ N1 ||dmt in both cases are P.P.T.-indistinguishable (otherwise suppose they are P.P.T.-distinguishable with the difference δ≥1/poly(k), it's not hard to construct either a selective ANO_CPA or IND_CPA attacker against Π with an advantage at least δ/N 1 , contradicting with Π's either selective ANO_CPA anonymity or data-privacy). Now denote the ciphertext sequence ξ 1 ||…||ξ N1 in two cases as ξ 1
(1) and ξ 1 (2) ||…||ξ N1 (2) respectively, denote the transcripts in session of IA-NMZPoK as IA-NMZPoK (1) (=tr S2,A (mpk||M 0 || ξ 1
||…||ξ N1
( 1) )) and IA-NMZPoK (2) (=tr P1,A (mpk||M 0 ||ξ 1 (2) ||…||ξ N1 (2) ))) respectively, by the above analysis we have ξ 1 (1) ||…||ξ N1 (1) ≈ PPT ξ 1 (2) ||…||ξ N1 (2) ; furthermore, by IA-NMZPoK's zero-knowledge property we have IA-NMZPoK (2) ≈ PPT IA-NMZPoK::Sim 2 (ξ 1 (2) ||…||ξ N1 (2) , s) and by S 2 's construction we have IA-NMZPoK (1) =IA-NMZPoK::Sim 2 (ξ 1 (1) ||…||ξ N1 (1) , s) so IA-NMZPoK (1) ≈ PPT IA-NMZPoK (2) . As a result, the transcripts received by A in both cases are P.P.T.-indistinguishable. Let δ be ∆ П Blind-UKG 's extractor's error function(negligible in k), then the probability with which S 2 correctly extracts A's one data-item y* i is at least P[A(mpk;P 1 (mpk,msk))=UKG(msk,y* i )]-δ, so the probability with which S 2 correctly extracts A's all values v* 1 ,…,v* N is at least P[A(mpk;P 1 (mpk, msk))=UKG(msk,v* i ): i=1,…,N]-N 2 δ ≥ P[P 2 outputs Join(w:X 1 ,X 2 )]-Nδ. As a result, S 2 's output is P.P.T.-indistinguishable from A's output in Ψ with respect to the GUC-environment Z with an error upper-bounded by N 1 (k)( + )+N 2 δ (N≤N 2 ) which is negligible in k.
Note that in both cases the other party P 1 *(X 1 ) and P 1 (X 1 ) always output the same N, so we have the By all the facts, we have Ψ→ GUC F Join .
APPENDIX.C PROOF OF THEOREM 4.1
All parties are assumed to be initialized with a copy of the common reference string ACRS, i. Now we prove 's GUC-security in two cases that the real-world adversary A corrupts P 1 or P 2 respectively. Below P 1 * and P 2 * stand for P 1 and P 2 's respective counterparts in ideal-world. as W. From A's perspective, the transcripts due to its interactions with S 1 and the transcripts due to its interactions with the real-world party P 2 (a*)(P 2 (a*) stands for party P 2 possessing a*, the same private input as the ideal-world party P 2 *) differs in: a)W depends on a in the former case, denoted as W(a),
while it depends on a* in the latter case and denoted as W(a*); b)IA-NMZPoK III 's witness depends on a in the former case while it depends on a* in the latter. 
